

# **Real Time Grid Reliability Management**

## **Reliability and Markets**

**November 29, 2001  
Washington, DC**


Robert J. Thomas  
Cornell University

Power Systems Engineering Research Center

# Grid Reliability Management Challenges

- Large volumes of transactions/low reserve margins stressing grid operations
- System constraints affecting use and care of the grid system
- Deregulation uncertainty contributed to reduced systems expansions and upgrades
- Western system margin is low; exact amount unknown

## Transmission Line Construction:



- Data from BPA / May 2001

# **Vision For Reliability Management in Restructured Electricity Markets**



- Reliability management must move from modeling machines and engineering analysis to understanding market behavior and its impact on grid systems
- Operators need real-time information that facilitates reliability management
- Operators need tools to measure, monitor, assess, and predict both system performance and the performance of market participants
- Grid needs to be enhanced to incorporate the latest advances in sensing, communication, computing, visualization, and algorithmic techniques and technologies

# CERTS Real-Time Grid Reliability Management Roadmap



## Reliability

*Adequacy and Performance*

*System Security Management Tools*

*Phasor Applications for Dispatchers and Engineers, and Future Controls*

***Development, and Demonstrate Reliability Adequacy Tools:***

- VAR Management
- Ancillary Svcs Performance
- Wide Control Areas ACE/AIE Performance
- Effective Information Visualization

***Security and Congestion Assessment Tools:***

- Integrated Security Analysis
- Congestion Management
- Cascading and Self Organized Criticality Utilization

***Dispatcher and Operating Engineering Applications Using Synchronized Phasor Measurements:***

- Monitoring & Post Disturbance Tool
- Enhance Stability Nomograms
- Standard, Low Cost, Reliable Phasor Technologies
- Validation of Stability Models

***Prototype New Real Time Controls***

Based on Distributed Closed Loop Feedback Controls and Synchronized Phasor Measurements

1999-2001


2001-2003

2000-2003


2001-2005

- **VAR Management Tool**
  - Developed by DOE in FY99-FY00
  - CEC funding to demonstrate at CAISO - Fall 2001
  - In discussion with AEP for future demonstration
- **NERC ACE/AIE Compliance Monitoring Tools**
  - Developed by DOE in FY01
  - Demonstrations at NERC Security Coordinators – Fall 2001
- **Synchronized Phasor Measurement Workstation**
  - Developed by DOE/EPRI/BPA/WAPA in WAMS program
  - CEC funding to demonstrate updated workstation at CAISO - Fall 2001
  - In discussions with AEP and TVA for future demonstrations

# CERTS VAR Management Tool: Turns Data Into Information




# ACE Monitoring – Identifies Problems In Real-Time and Supports Corrective Action



Each bubble represents a Control Area. The Inner most color is the ACE. The outermost is the ratio  $ACE/L10$  where  $ACE / L10 > 1$  Red,  $ACE / L10 < 1$  Blue, and anything else = White.

# Modeling failure for WSCC breakup of August 10, 1996 (MW on California-Oregon Interconnection)





# **Reliability and Markets – What are we working on?**



- **Understanding linkages between the physical grid and market mechanisms that will lead to the development of a new generation of design and operating tools**
- **Tools to increase reliance on market forces to ensure system reliability**
- **Market designs for system reliability needs (stable and efficient) validated through experimental testing**

# Why do experimental testing of electricity markets?



- ▶ There is a large gap between observed behavior and what is predicted by economic theory
- ▶ Currently known models are too complex for theory to adequately address a complete analysis
- ▶ Less expensive financially and socially to try new concepts in the lab before trying them on a state


**Replicate the high price volatility observed in existing electricity markets using a “smart” market (POWERWEB)**

- 30 Bus Network
- Human subjects (6) represent generators
- Pay real money proportional to profits
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- Pay real money proportional to profits
- Use various auction mechanisms
- Make load stochastic
- Standby charges for participation


**Test four different auctions**

- Uniform price auction with price inelastic load (last accepted offer)
- Uniform price auction with price responsive load
- Discriminative auction (pay actual offers)
- Soft cap auction (uniform price below and discriminative price above)


## Capacity Offered into an Auction Without Standby Costs




## Market Prices Without Standby Costs




# Capacity Offered into an Auction with Standby Costs



## Market Prices with Standby Costs



# PowerWeb






# Can Operators Predict Market Behavior?


*Results of Market Simulations Performed by PSERC*

## Regulated System




- Economic dispatch
- Strong correlation between power flow and demand

## Deregulated Market




- Market-based dispatch
- Poor correlation between power flow and demand

Capacity in each Generator V Time period for Illinois-U.P. Exp466



dark blue <\$50/MWh - light blue \$50-\$75/MWh - yellow \$75-\$90/MWh - red >\$90/MWh


Capacity in each Generator V Time period for Illinois-P.R. Exp468



dark blue <\$50/MWh - light blue \$50-\$75/MWh - yellow \$75-\$90/MWh - red >\$90/MWh




Capacity in each Generator V Time period for Illinois-D.A. Exp470




dark blue <\$50/MWh - light blue \$50-\$75/MWh - yellow \$75-\$90/MWh - red >\$90/MWh

Capacity in each Generator V Time period for Illinois-S.C. Exp472



dark blue <\$50/MWh - light blue \$50-\$75/MWh - yellow \$75-\$90/MWh - red >\$90/MWh

## Average Prices for High and Low Loads



# What have we tested for?



- ▶ Simple energy auctions
  - cost efficiency
  - competitive pricing
  - price spikes
  - market power
  - unit-commitment issues
  - pay-as-bid/soft-cap auctions
- ▶ Multi-dimensional auctions
  - reactive power
  - reserves
  - regulation, load following, etc.